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ABSTRACT 
Bloom Filter Based Intrusion Detection for Smart Grid. 
(May 2012) 
Saranya Parthasarathy, B.Tech., National Institute of Technology, India 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Deepa Kundur 
This thesis addresses the problem of local intrusion detection for SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) field devices in the smart grid. A 
methodology is proposed to detect anomalies in the communication patterns using a 
combination of n-gram analysis and Bloom Filter. The predictable and regular nature of 
the SCADA communication patterns is exploited to train the intrusion detection system. 
The protocol considered to test the proposed approach is MODBUS which is used for 
communication between a SCADA server and field devices in power system. The 
approach is tested for attacks like HMI compromise and Man-in-the-Middle.  
Bloom Filter is chosen because of its strong space advantage over other data 
structures like hash tables, linked lists etc. for representing sets. The advantage comes 
from its probabilistic nature and compact array structure. The false positive rates are 
found to be minimal with careful choice of parameters for Bloom Filter design. Also the 
memory-efficient property of Bloom Filter makes it suitable for implementation in 
resource constrained SCADA components. It is also established that the knowledge of 
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physical state of the power system i.e., normal, emergency or restorative state can help 
in improving the accuracy of the proposed approach. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A smart grid is defined as “the integration of real-time monitoring, advanced 
sensing, and communications, enabling the dynamic flow of both energy and 
information to accommodate various forms of supply, delivery, and use in a secure and 
reliable electric power system, from generation source to end-user” [1] (according to the 
definition by North American Electric Reliability Corporation). The main motivations 
behind smart grid are to achieve better control over the delivery of electricity to 
individual consumers thereby optimizing energy usage, enabling dynamic pricing of 
electricity and promoting renewable energy sources. To enable better control, 
information flow is two-way which will enable an electric utility to monitor the energy 
usage inside customer’s premises. Smart meters are being newly installed at households 
for this purpose. Another major change for the purpose of smart grid is the integration of 
Information Technology (IT) systems with the existing power system components for 
better monitoring and control. 
For example, SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems) 
which are one of the major components of the power system are becoming information 
technology(IT) enabled with components like sensors, IEDs (Intelligent Electronic 
Devices) etc. to provide real-time measurements to the control center. These 
measurements are used for major functions like contingency analysis, corrections for  
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. 
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real and reactive power dispatch etc. It is common to have corporate IT networks 
connected to the SCADA networks for the collection of production data as shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 SCADA System Interconnection with Corporate Networks 
Due to the increase in the IT components in the grid, the number of potential 
electronic access points increases which can be targeted by the attackers. If any 
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vulnerability in newly installed smart meters, communication networks, or SCADA 
systems can be exploited by the attackers, the entire grid can be compromised. For 
example, the consequences of affecting a major component in a power system by 
gaining access to a single component were demonstrated by Idaho National Labs in 
2007. This demonstration showed the capability of an attack targeting a generator by 
gaining access to an associated control system. This eventually led to destabilization of a 
generator bringing it to a halt. Another recent example of how a failure in any part of the 
grid can have cascading effects is the 2003 Northeast power blackout which affected 
nearly 50 million people [2]. Power was restored in most affected areas within 48 hours, 
but it was not restored in few places for up to a week. The propagation of the failure was 
very fast as it took only seven minutes for it to sweep across the region. Though this is 
not a cyber attack, it shows the impact of cascading failures on the grid. Cyber attacks 
can cause similar cascading failures if they target certain key elements of the power 
system. 
In response to the increasing threats and vulnerabilities in the power grid, various 
security measures have been proposed. These include  
 Encryption of network traffic. 
 Better authentication mechanisms like using tokens and biometric measures. 
 Not using default passwords in field devices like RTUs (Remote Terminal 
Units), PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) etc. 
 Increased monitoring of network activities for detection of  attacks, access 
logging. 
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 Vulnerability assessment, penetration testing of power system components. 
Despite all these measures, there are still a lot of vulnerabilities which can be 
exploited by an attacker. One main reason is that power systems, like most other critical 
infrastructures were not initially designed with cyber security as an important criterion in 
mind. Other reasons include the complex architecture of the grid and lack of security 
culture among the grid operators. 
1.1 Cyber Security in SCADA Systems 
SCADA systems are one of the major components in the power systems. These 
are responsible for distributed monitoring, control, collection and analysis of real-time 
data over a wide area. The main components of a SCADA system are SCADA server 
and field devices like PLCs, RTUs and IEDs as shown in Figure 1. The interconnection 
of SCADA network with the enterprise or corporate networks is the weakest link in 
SCADA system security. Compromised SCADA systems will have a direct impact on 
the underlying physical system, i.e., the power system. For instance, even changing the 
status of a single circuit breaker from ‘open’ to ‘close’ can cause considerable damage. 
This can range from equipment damage to impacting personnel safety.  
The SCADA components have certain vulnerabilities which can be exploited to 
compromise them. They can be mainly classified into two kinds as follows: 
System-level: As SCADA systems are connected to corporate networks, compromising 
the corporate networks and the associated firewalls is a means of gaining access to 
SCADA components. Even without compromising them, an attacker can gain access to 
certain SCADA components like field devices which are equipped with Blue tooth and 
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Wi-Fi technologies. These are examples of vulnerabilities which arise by design. One 
solution to handle them is to disallow remote access to field devices. But it is not a 
viable option as this will affect the desired functionality. Suppose individual field 
devices are made secure and robust, interconnection of individually secure devices or 
systems can still give rise to certain vulnerabilities. For example, a nuclear power plant 
was automatically shut down due to the rebooting of a control system workstation 
though the workstation and control system were not on the same network [3]. The 
individual system-level and interconnection vulnerabilities can be addressed by some 
existing off-the-shelf commercial security solutions. But such solutions may not be 
suitable because of the following reasons: 
 There are some SCADA specific operating systems and applications  
which may not be interoperable with existing COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) 
cyber security solutions.  
 Some of the SCADA field devices do not have the sufficient computing  
resources for enabling security. 
Protocol-level: Protocols used for communication in SCADA systems include 
DNP3, MODBUS, etc. These do not have even primitive authentication, integrity checks 
or encryption options. This is because they were initially designed only for serial 
communication but later modified and enhanced to run over TCP/IP, Ethernet, etc.  
Hence there are vulnerabilities from two sources, generic vulnerabilities from TCP/IP 
and the vulnerabilities specific to the protocol used (MODBUS, DNP3, etc). 
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These vulnerabilities can be exploited to launch various kinds of attacks as discussed 
below. 
Flooding/Denial of Service: This attack can be launched in two ways, blocking 
data flow through SCADA communication networks or by affecting the timeliness by 
delaying the data. This can be achieved by flooding a network with unwanted packets. If 
the SCADA communication channel is flooded with unwanted packets, the field devices 
will try to execute the commands received from all the packets which may result in the 
exhaustion of their resources. Hence the devices will stop responding to the legitimate 
packets in course of time and data flow gets affected. 
Man-in-the-middle attack: Due to lack of integrity checks in SCADA protocols, 
attackers can intercept the communication between field devices and SCADA server and 
modify the MODBUS request and response messages according to their will. These 
forged messages can be used to execute commands in a PLC and cause any damage to 
the underlying physical system. Examples include unwarranted opening or closing of 
circuit breakers, switches etc.  
Replay attacks: Due to the lack of time-stamps in SCADA protocols, attackers 
can modify packets and transmit them later for their malicious acts.  For example, one 
type of attack is to capture packets during normal operation at the control center and play 
them back to the operator indicating normal behavior while the attacker continues to 
send malicious commands to the field devices. 
Vulnerabilities in SCADA systems have been exploited in the past and attacks 
have been launched against critical infrastructure as discussed in the examples below: 
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Stuxnet:  Stuxnet worm was discovered in the summer of 2010. It started by 
exploiting multiple zero-day vulnerabilities on PCs running Microsoft Windows. Once it 
enters a computer system through shared network files or a USB, it looks for a specific 
Siemens SCADA program. If this program is running in the system, it searches for a 
particular industrial equipment configuration. If this configuration is found, then 
read/write requests to PLCs are intercepted and manipulated while reporting normal 
functioning to the operator. The modifications to the PLC code are hidden using root 
kits. As these PLCs are responsible for controlling the spinning speeds of centrifuges, 
this attack caused huge damage to the rotating centrifuges [4]. It has been widely 
believed that Stuxnet is aimed at causing heavy damage to Iran’s uranium enriching 
facility at Natanz. 
Aurora: The Aurora demonstration performed by the Idaho National Laboratory 
(INL) and shown on CNN used a cyber-attack to destroy a diesel generator. They used 
dial-up modems to attack diesel generator [5]. 
Maroochy WasteWater Wireless SCADA attack: This is the case of a disgruntled 
ex-employee using wireless equipment to access the SCADA system, by issuing radio 
commands to sewage equipment which caused large quantities of raw sewage to flow 
into local parks, rivers etc [5]. The sewage system experienced multiple serial faults 
during this incident like pumps not running when they should have been, alarms not 
being properly reported to the central computer, problems in communication between 
the central computer and the field devices (i.e.) pumping stations. This is an example of 
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an insider attack which included stealing equipment, issuing unwarranted radio 
commands, using false network address, sending false instructions and disabling alarms. 
Such attacks on SCADA system components have considerable impact on 
critical infrastructures. Hence security is an important concern for SCADA systems or 
industrial control systems associated with critical infrastructures. 
1.2 Intrusion Detection 
Cyber intrusion is a means of compromising a system by performing 
unauthorized activities. To reduce such intrusions on SCADA systems, certain measures 
have been suggested like isolating SCADA from corporate networks, encrypting 
SCADA data and enforcing validated passwords, introducing redundancies for critical 
nodes etc. Despite these measures, there is still a need to have an intrusion detection and 
recovery mechanism which is evident from the recent attacks on industrial control 
systems discussed in the Section 1.1. There are some challenges in developing these 
SCADA specific intrusion detection systems as they different from the conventional IT 
system in the following ways: 
 Timeliness and availability at all times is critical, hence the CIA (Confidentiality-
Integrity-Availability) in IT system becomes AIC (Availability-Integrity-
Confidentiality) in SCADA systems. 
 Availability of limited memory and computing resources in field devices like 
PLCs, RTUs 
 Logic inside SCADA has a direct impact on the physical system it controls. 
 9 
 Attack on a SCADA system can have cascading effects on the underlying 
physical system. There should be protection measures to prevent such cascading 
failures and aid in graceful degradation of the physical system.  
The design of an intrusion detection system for SCADA should take into consideration 
the above differences. 
1.3 Contributions of This Thesis 
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
1. A Bloom Filter based intrusion detection approach for resource constrained 
SCADA components in the smart grid is proposed. Bloom Filter is a data 
structure which represents a set of data in a concise form and hence suitable for 
representing the set of normal traffic patterns in power system SCADA 
communication concisely. Also as it has low memory requirements, it is suitable 
for localized intrusion detection in SCADA components like RTUs, PLCs which 
have limited computational resources. 
2. The proposed approach has been tested for SCADA communication traces using 
MODBUS protocol which is used for communication between a SCADA server 
and devices like RTUs and PLCs. 
3. Bloom Filter is compared against another data structure, the standard hash table. 
It is found that look ups are of order O (1) in Bloom Filter where as it is not the 
case with standard hash table implementation. In hash tables, there is an extra 
overhead for searching through a linked list for look ups. Hence, in comparison 
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with hash tables, Bloom Filter is found to be efficient in performing look ups for 
identifying normal behavior during intrusion detection. 
4. The intrusion detection approach is tested with and without the knowledge of the 
current state of the underlying physical system. It is found that consideration of 
the current state of the physical system, (i.e. power system) along with the 
information from cyber components, (i.e., parameters extracted from SCADA 
network traffic) will be helpful in improving the quality of the proposed intrusion 
detection system. 
1.4 Organization of This Thesis 
In Section 2, we provide an overview of the components involved in power 
system SCADA communication and the MODBUS protocol used in SCADA 
communication. Also we explain the intrusion detection techniques in general and 
discuss the existing SCADA specific intrusion detection approaches. In Section 3, we 
discuss the SCADA architecture, threat model and attack scenarios considered for our 
proposed intrusion detection framework. We compare the two approaches, hash-table 
and Bloom Filter for SCADA intrusion detection and explain the advantages of using 
Bloom Filter approach. We also discuss how the various design parameters of Bloom 
Filter are chosen. Then we explain how the correlation between the states of the power 
system with the SCADA network traffic can be leveraged to improve the intrusion 
detection mechanism. In Section 4, we present the results obtained for Bloom Filter 
based approach by using training data for both normal and emergency states of the 
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power system. In Section 5, we provide an assessment of the results and present 
directions for further improvements and future work. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
This section provides an overview of the components involved in the power 
system SCADA communication in Section 2.1. This communication involves SCADA 
protocols and one of these protocols named MODBUS is explained in detail in Section 
2.2. Then the general intrusion detection techniques and a literature review of the 
existing SCADA specific intrusion detection approaches are discussed in Section 2.3. 
2.1 Communications in SCADA for Power Systems 
       The major components in Power System SCADA are as follows:  a central 
computer server called as the SCADA server or SCADA master, field data interface 
devices like Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) 
and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), a communication system to transfer data 
between the field devices and SCADA server and a user interface called Human 
Machine Interface (HMI).  RTUs convert data from devices like sensors, switches, 
transmitters into a form which can be transmitted over the communication channel. 
PLCs store instructions for the field devices in the form of procedures. They act on the 
inputs from RTUs and perform actions based on time, events or a particular sequence. 
For example, they are responsible for opening or closing a sequence of circuit breakers 
under emergency conditions. The protocols used in the communication system include 
MODBUS, DNP3 which follow a master-slave technique for communication. The 
SCADA servers process the information received from PLCs, RTUs and present them in 
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a form which can be interpreted by the human operator. This processed information is 
displayed in a User Interface to the operator. These are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Major Components in Power System SCADA Communication 
2.2 MODBUS Protocol 
This messaging protocol has been the industrial standard for communication 
among automation and control devices since 1979. Originally it was designed for serial 
communication. Recently, it has been modified to run over Ethernet and is at the 
application layer (level 7) of the OSI model. It provides client/server communication 
between devices connected on different types of networks. It uses the master slave 
method at the message level but peer-peer method at network level. The master or the 
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client initiates the transactions with the slave devices (or servers) by sending requests 
and the slaves respond to the requests by performing the requested action. MODBUS 
can be implemented in three different ways:  
 As a serial protocol in RTU mode.  
 As a serial protocol in ASCII format. 
 Ethernet based MODBUS TCP. 
ASCII mode: Each byte is sent as two ASCII characters. Each ASCII character 
contains one Hexadecimal character. The format for each byte is as follows:   Every byte 
has 1 start bit and 7 data bits.  If even or odd parity is used, 1 bit is reserved for parity 
and 1 bit is used as stop bit. If parity is not used, two bits are used as stop bits. The error 
checking is done using LRC (Longitudinal Redundancy Check) error check. 
RTU mode: The coding system used is 8–bit binary for a message which 
corresponds to two 4-bit hexadecimal characters. This has 1 start bit, 8 data bits with 1 
start bit and 8 data bits. The parity and stop bits are similar to those in ASCII mode and 
the error check used is Cyclical Redundancy Check (CRC). 
TCP/IP over Ethernet:  MODBUS has been ported over TCP/IP and embedded 
into the payload of a TCP packet. Port 502 is reserved for this purpose. Currently, this is 
the most widely used MODBUS implementation. The query from the master using the 
MODBUS protocol consists of the device address, a function code corresponding to the 
action requested, any data to be transmitted, and an error–checking field as shown in 
Figure 3.   
 15 
 
Figure 3 Master Slave Query Response Cycle 
 
The data bytes contain additional information needed by the slave to perform the 
function indicated by the function code. The slave’s response message constructed using 
MODBUS contains fields confirming the action taken, any data to be returned, and an 
error–checking field. If an error occurred which resulted in the slave device not 
performing the requested action, the slave sends an error message as the response. The 
case of error free MODBUS transaction is shown below in Figure 4: 
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Figure 4 Error-free MODBUS Transaction 
 
 Apart from function code and data, there are additional fields in the MODBUS 
packet as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 General Format of MODBUS Request/Response over TCP/IP 
Perform the action 
Initiate the response 
      Receive the response 
         Initiate Request 
              Slave                      Master 
Function Code + Data request 
Function Code + Data response 
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The function code together with the data called as a Protocol Data Unit (PDU) is 
independent of the underlying communication layers. Function code is of 1 byte. Hence 
the range is 1-255, in which 128-255 are reserved for exception responses. Data is of 2 
bytes. The Protocol Data Unit together with certain additional fields constitute the ADU 
(Application Data Unit). These additional fields are called MBAP Header as shown in 
Figure 6 and explained in Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 6 MBAP Header 
Table 1 Fields in MODBUS ADU Header 
Field Name 
Length(in 
bytes) 
Description 
Transaction 
Identifier 
2 
Identifier for the MODBUS Request/Response 
transaction 
Protocol 
Identifier 
2 0 for MODBUS 
Length 2  
Byte count of the fields, Unit Identifier and Data 
fields 
Unit Identifier 1  
Identifier for any remote slave connected on a serial 
line or other buses 
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There are three categories of function codes used in MODBUS request/reply.  
1. Public function codes: These are unique function codes which are publicly 
documented. Some examples include 0x01(Read Coils), 0x05(Write Single Coil), 
0x04(Read Input register), 0x06(Write Single Register) etc. The list has been 
shown in the Appendix A. 
2. User- Defined function codes: These include two ranges: 65-72 and 100-110. 
These codes can be selected and implemented by the user. 
3. Reserved Function Codes: These are not available for public use and are used 
by some companies for legacy products.  
 The PDUs are classified into three different kinds as follows: 
 MODBUS Request PDU, mb_req_pdu = {function_code, request_data} where 
function_code corresponds to the 1-byte function code requested through the client API 
and request_data is the n-byte data containing references to the register address, offsets, 
variable counts etc.  
 MODBUS Response PDU, mb_resp_pdu = {function_code, response_data} 
where function_code is the same as the one in the Request PDU and response_data field 
is function code dependent.  
 MODBUS Exception Response PDU, mb_excep_rsp_pdu= {function_code, 
response_data} where function_code  is the sum of MODBUS function code and 0x80. 
An example of a request and response PDU in MODBUS transactions is shown in Table 
2. 
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Table 2 Example of MODBUS Request Response Transaction 
Request PDU 
Response PDU 
Function 01 Function 01 
Starting Address Hi 00 Byte Count 03 
Starting Address Lo 13 Outputs status 27-20 CD 
Quantity of outputs Hi 00 Outputs status 35-28 6B 
Quantity of outputs Lo 13 Outputs status 38-36 05 
 
The request PDU corresponds to “read 19 coils starting from the address 19”. 
The individual fields are to be interpreted as follows: The MODBUS function code 0x01 
in both request and response PDUs corresponds to ‘Read coils’.  The starting address is 
0013 in hexadecimal and the quantity of registers to be read is also 0013 in hexadecimal 
as shown in the request PDU.  In the response, the byte count 3 indicates that the ensuing 
3 bytes are the data requested. The data bytes are CD, 6B and 05 in hexadecimal. The 
status of the registers 27–20 is shown as CD hex, or binary 1100 1101. Output 27 is the 
MSB, and output 20 is the LSB. In the last data byte, the status of outputs 38-36 is 
shown as 05 hex, or binary 0000 0101. Output 38 is in the sixth bit position from the left, 
and output 36 is the LSB of this byte. The remaining 5 high order bits are zero filled. 
The MODBUS requests and responses discussed have a direct correlation with the 
underlying physical system. Hence spoofing of such requests and responses can be used 
as a means of intruding into the physical system. 
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2.3 Intrusion Detection for SCADA  
Intrusion Detection is the process of identifying intrusions in a system. The 
intrusion detection methods are classified into two main categories: misuse-based and 
anomaly-based [6]. 
1. Misuse-based: This is based on constructing signatures from known attack 
patterns and vulnerabilities. The patterns of known attacks are specified as rule 
sets. There are some languages like SNORT, RUSSEL, P-BEST etc. developed 
for representing the rule sets. The advantages are higher detection rate and lower 
false alarm rates for known attacks. The limitation is that it cannot detect 
unknown or novel attacks. 
2. Anomaly-based: This is based on capturing the normal behavior of a system 
using some features extracted from the system considered. The intuition behind 
this approach is that something that is abnormal can be suspicious. This usually 
involves two phases: an initial training phase and a detection phase. During the 
training phase, normal behavior of the system being monitored is learnt and a 
profile is built to represent this normal behavior. During the detection phase, the 
behavior of the system is observed and when it is deviant from the normal 
profile, an anomaly flag is raised. The advantage of this approach is that it can 
detect new attacks which misuse-based approaches cannot. The drawbacks are  
 High false alarm rates 
 False positives and negatives are highly dependent on training data.  
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 If the normal behavior of the system changes over time, normal profiles 
also need to be updated accordingly. 
Following are few of the anomaly-based methods: 
Statistical learning: In this, normal system behavior is captured using statistical 
models. For example, measures like mean, standard deviation are used to represent the 
normal range of certain parameters during training. During detection, the deviation from 
the normal range is used to assign an anomaly score for every parameter. The weighted 
sum of the anomaly scores obtained for various parameters is the final score indicative 
of the anomalous behavior of the system. 
Specification based: The normal behavior is represented using sequential 
patterns. For example, a sequence of function calls or sequences of state changes are 
extracted from the system during training phase and a model corresponding to normal 
behavior is built. During detection, the same states/function calls extracted from the 
system are organized into sequences and compared against the normal model established 
during training phase. It has a high potential for generalization and even new types of 
attacks can be detected. The drawback is that it requires substantial efforts to 
characterize the model for normal behavior. 
The suitability of these methods to SCADA traffic has been studied by various 
people as explained in the paper on SCADA specific Intrusion Detection Techniques [7]. 
For example, Steven et al. [8] have proposed a specification-based multi-IDS algorithm 
based on a formal model of the underlying MODBUS/TCP. They have used SNORT 
rules to analyze violations in communication patterns. Yang et al. [9] have proposed an 
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anomaly detection method for SCADA systems based on features like network traffic, 
link utilization, CPU usage etc.  Their method represents the features as a vector which 
is fed as input to an auto associative kernel regression (AAKR) model which predicts the 
correct versions of the input. Residuals are formed by comparing the observed values 
with the predictions from the model. A binary hypothesis technique called the sequential 
probability ratio test (SPRT) is applied to the residuals to determine if the residuals 
correspond to a normal or abnormal distribution. The attacks considered are DOS, ping 
flood, jolt2 etc. Oman and Phillips [10] have proposed a misuse-based intrusion 
detection approach and event monitoring by producing signatures for unauthorized 
access in SCADA devices. Details about each SCADA device like its IP address, telnet 
port, and legal commands for each device are expressed using XML. A Perl program 
parses this XML and creates SNORT signatures which are used in detecting attacks 
later. There are also commercial MODBUS filtering modules like Cisco’s Net filter 
which is rule-based [11]. Chabukswar et al. [12] have simulated a simple SCADA 
system consisting of a plant and a controller and studied the effects of attacks like 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) on the communication network between the plant 
and the controller. Carcano et al. [13] have developed a state based approach to represent 
the internal critical states of the SCADA system caused by malicious MODBUS 
commands embedded in a single packet. Giani et al. [14] have developed a SCADA test 
bed based on Simulink/ State flow from Math works and tested attacks like Denial of 
Service attack on sensors, Integrity attacks, Phishing attacks, etc. Mallouhi et al. [15] 
have developed a test bed to simulate a SCADA client, server and power grid. They have 
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also proposed an Autonomic Software Protection System (ASPS) which has rules to 
analyze MODBUS requests/responses. This system selectively drops packets and 
protects the SCADA systems from flooding and Denial of Service (DOS) Attacks. 
Most of these existing methods are based on the parameters extracted from 
TCP/IP traffic or other generic ETHERNET parameters. There are few methods specific 
to MODBUS which are rule based and depends on the MODBUS request or response 
within a single packet. Our proposed approach differs from these in the following ways: 
 It addresses the problem of intrusion detection at application layer level by 
leveraging the parameters in the MODBUS payload embedded within the TCP 
packet.  
 It takes into account the sequence of MODBUS packets and not a single packet. 
 It takes into account the physical state of the power system to model the cyber-
physical relationship in the power system.  
 It focuses on the design of an intrusion detection system which is suitable for 
implementation in field devices. 
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3. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
This Section discusses the problem formulation and proposed solutions for local 
intrusion detection in SCADA field devices for smart grid. The architecture considered, 
the threat model and the attack scenarios considered for intrusion detection are discussed 
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. The two approaches considered for intrusion detection, viz, the 
hash table and Bloom Filter are described in detail and their pros and cons are compared 
in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, the process of enhancing the intrusion detection using 
physical information is presented. 
3.1 Problem Formulation 
The problem is to detect intrusions locally in SCADA field devices for smart 
grid. An intrusion detection system needs to be developed for this purpose. Such a 
system should be able to detect the malicious commands sent by an attacker to the 
SCADA field devices like RTUs, PLCs to affect the underlying power system 
components. These commands may be sent either by compromising the HMI or by 
compromising the communication link between the SCADA server and the field devices. 
The system has to work at the application level by extracting certain parameters from the 
traffic flow between the SCADA master and the field devices.  
The architecture considered for this problem is a typical SCADA master-slave 
configuration as shown in Figure 7. The main components are HMI at the operator 
workstation, SCADA master, field devices like RTUs, PLCs and the communication 
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links between them. The communication between SCADA master and field devices are 
assumed to follow MODBUS over the TCP/IP protocol.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 SCADA Master-Slave Architecture 
MODBUS protocol was chosen for the following reasons:   
 It is the most widely used application layer protocol for communications between 
the SCADA master and field devices in industrial networks.  
 MODBUS protocol has inherent vulnerabilities due to lack of authentication, 
authorization and encryption in Protocol Design and Specification and it is 
possible for an attacker to exploit these vulnerabilities easily. 
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Though the problem is formulated using MODBUS, the same can be applied to 
any SCADA protocol. The problem assumes a specific threat model which is detailed 
below. 
3.2 Threat Model 
The main threats considered are external targeted attacks. Threats from insiders 
are not considered. Also it is assumed that the attacker compromises a single specific 
component of the SCADA system like the HMI or communication link at any point of 
time. Colluded distributed attacks are not considered. The attack scenarios under this 
assumed threat model are as follows: 
1. HMI Compromise: This is the case where the attacker has compromised the 
HMI and can send commands to destabilize the grid. Common HMI commands 
in a power system include read bus line status, read transformer status, 
read/change magnitude and phase angle of the bus, open/close circuit breakers 
etc. While the attacker can manipulate these commands as per his attack 
objectives, he can also make sure that the display at the operator interface does 
not show the actual state of the system.  
2. Man-in-the-middle attack: This involves intercepting communication between 
SCADA server and field devices and sending spoofed packets to them. This can 
be used by the attacker as a means of performing illegal writes to coils or 
registers, restarting MODBUS server multiple times, etc. These operations can 
affect the states of components in the power system and can eventually 
destabilize the grid. 
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3.3 Proposed Solutions 
Our proposed approach of intrusion detection is based on the intuition that the 
above mentioned attacks get manifested as anomalies in the MODBUS request/response 
traffic patterns. These can be detected by establishing a normal profile and by comparing 
against it. To establish the normal profile, parameters such as function code and data in 
MODBUS TCP/IP PDU are extracted. The entire process can be implemented using the 
following two steps.  
3.3.1 Data Extraction Using n-gram Analysis 
 
N-gram is a contiguous sequence of n items. Data extraction involves extracting 
the MODBUS PDU information (function code and data) from the traffic between the 
MODBUS server and the field devices using a sliding window of some length, say ‘n’.  
The size of ‘n’ is dependent on the nature of traffic. By varying the window size between 
5 and 12, we find that the performance is better for a window size of 5.   A sample trace 
of the MODBUS payload within the TCP packet is shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8 Sample Trace for MODBUS TCP/IP Packet 
We can see that the function code in the payload is ‘1’ which corresponds to 
‘read coils’. Say, the MODBUS function codes in the five contiguous packets are 1, 5, 5, 
1, 5 respectively, n-gram analysis to extract the function codes using a sliding window of 
length 5 will yield a sequence 15515. Such sequences are used in training and detection 
as explained below: 
3.3.2 Training and Anomaly-Based Detection  
The data for training is based on the various MODBUS register and command 
assignments discussed in [16]. The preliminary data is taken from [16] and some similar 
random data patterns are created to be used as the training data. The MODBUS function 
codes and the data like coil addresses from this training set are subject to n-gram 
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analysis and then represented in a compressed form using two different approaches, hash 
table and Bloom Filter. 
3.3.2.1 Hash Table    
This is a data structure that is used to quickly locate a data record. Its 
construction can be explained as follows:  Consider a set of input elements of size ‘n’. 
Each element in this set is called as a key. These keys are mapped to a one-dimensional 
array using a method called hashing. The functions which are used for hashing are called 
“hash functions”. Examples of such functions are shown in the Appendix A. These hash 
functions map the keys to hash values which correspond to indices in an array. Each 
index in the array is associated with a list of records which hashed to the corresponding 
index. This can be explained using an example as follows:  
Let us consider a list of words A, C, THE, YES, PART to be stored in a hash 
table. Consider a simple hash function which adds the position of each alphabet in a 
word followed by modulo-13 operation. The result of such hashing will be 1%13, 3%13, 
33%13, 49%13, 55%13 which is equal to 1, 3, 7, 10, 3 respectively. Hence the key to 
hash value mapping will be as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Hash Key Value Mapping 
A 1 
C 3 
THE 7 
YES 10 
PART 3 
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These hash values correspond to the indices in an array and each index points to 
a list of keys as shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 Hash Table Construction 
Such a construction is called as hash table and can be used for storing the 
sequence of function codes and data obtained during n-gram analysis of the training data 
set. After the training data set is represented in the form of a hash table, this can be used 
for anomaly detection.  
The n-grams obtained from communication patterns to be tested are hashed using 
the same hash function used in training. The output obtained after hashing corresponds 
to the array index where the record has to be searched for.  The list at the particular 
index is traversed and if the input data is present in the list, the communication pattern is 
normal. If not, an anomaly score needs to be assigned. The efficiency of this method 
depends on the lengths of the linked lists which in turn depend on the hash function used 
and the size of the array.  
The disadvantage in this approach is the overhead for sequential searching in the 
linked list. As an alternative to this approach, another data structure called Bloom Filter 
is considered for our implementation which is described below. 
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3.3.2.2 Bloom Filter 
Bloom Filter is a probabilistic data structure which is a memory-efficient 
alternative to the traditional look up hash method. According to [17], Bloom filter can be 
used to represent a set in a compact form if the effect of false positives can be mitigated.  
It has two components; a set of ‘k’ hash functions and a bit vector of length ‘m’.  
Consider a set S={x1, x2, xn} of n elements given as input to the Bloom Filter. 
Consider the two components of the Bloom Filter as follows: a set of ‘k’ independent 
hash functions h1, h2 … hk with range {1, 2… m} and a vector ‘v’ of ‘m’ bits, all set to 
zero initially.  
To insert an element sϵS into the vector ‘v’ during training, it is hashed ‘k’ times 
and the bits in ‘v’ at the indices corresponding to the output of the hash functions are set 
to 1. A particular bit may be set to 1 multiple times by different inputs. To test if an 
element ‘b’ exists in the set S, the bits at positions h1(b), h2(b)……,hk(b) are checked 
and even if any one of them is zero, the element does not exist in the set S. Otherwise, 
the element may exist in the set. (i.e.) there is a probability for it to not exist as well. 
In our approach, Bloom Filter is used to efficiently store the sequence of function 
codes and data obtained during n-gram analysis of the training data set. The n-grams are 
hashed ‘k’ times and stored in the Bloom Filter during training. The n-grams obtained 
from the live communication patterns during detection are also hashed using the same 
’k’ hash functions used in training. The outputs, obtained after hashing, correspond to 
the indices in vector ‘v’ to be checked. If the bits at all of these indices are 1, the tested 
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pattern may be valid. Even if a single bit is zero, the tested pattern does not exist in the 
training set. 
3.3.2.3 Choice of Bloom Filter’s Parameters 
There is a trade –off between the memory requirements (m) of the Bloom filter 
and the false positive rate. The false positive rate can be tuned by the choice of 
parameters ‘m’ and ‘k’. The relationship can be derived as follows: 
After representing ‘n’ keys using the vector ‘v’ of size ‘m’, the probability that a 
bit in vector ‘v’ is still zero is given by  (1- 1/m)kn . Hence the probability of a false hit is 
given by 
( 1- (1- 1/m)
 kn
) 
k
 ~= (1-e
kn/m
)
 k
 
The right hand is minimized when k= ln (2) * (m/n) in which case it becomes 
(1/2)
 k
= (0.6185)
 m/n 
Another criterion to reduce false positive rate is to have at least half of the bits 
set in the bloom array, according to [17].   
The criteria for the selection of hash functions used in Bloom filter is as follows: 
 The hash function must be independent and uniformly distributed so that the 
output is equally distributed over the hash space. A hash function which satisfies 
avalanche criterion generates a uniform distribution. Whenever a single input bit 
is complemented, if each of the output bits change with a probability of 0.5 for 
any combination of the remaining input bits, the corresponding hash function is 
said to satisfy avalanche criterion. 
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 It should be light weight unlike some cryptographic hash functions. Examples of 
fast, simple hashes used in Bloom filters include murmur, FNV etc.   
 It should produce minimal collisions. A collision occurs when two inputs in S 
hash onto the same index in the vector ‘v’. If the number of elements (keys) to be 
hashed exceeds the size of the vector, then no hashing algorithm can hash every 
key to a unique index. Hence it is impossible to make any hash function collision 
free. It is only possible to find a hash function that produces minimal collisions 
for a particular considered set of data.  
Various hash functions have been proposed and implemented in literature. Few 
such hash functions are as follows: 
1. Shift-Add-XOR hash: This is mainly designed for hashing strings. It uses a 
combination of left and right shifts for mixing. The amount of shifts is usually 
prime. An example is given in the Appendix A. This is found to be simple but 
fails avalanche test and hence not suitable for implementing Bloom Filter. 
2. FNV hash: FNV hashing provides a high dispersion which is suitable for nearly 
identical strings such as URLs, hostnames, filenames, etc. The core of the FNV-1 
hash algorithm [18] is given in the Appendix A. FNV hashes are fast and has a 
low collision rate but they do not satisfy the property of setting at least half of the 
bits in the Bloom Filter. 
3. One-at-a-Time hash: A simple algorithm for this hash function is given in the 
Appendix A. This has good avalanche behavior but do not satisfy the property of 
setting at least half of the bits in the Bloom Filter. 
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4. Jenkins Hash: This has good avalanche behavior and has been well tested for its 
suitability for various types of input but the algorithm is too complicated and not 
suitable for light-weight applications. 
5. Murmur Hash:  The name comes from the following sequence of operations 
which mixes the bits of a value. k *= m;  x = rotate_left (k,r);  (multiply and 
rotate). When this is repeated many times, k ends up being pseudo-randomized. 
The choice of the two mixing constants, m and r decide the collision resistance of 
this hashing function. This hashing function is found to be suitable for Bloom 
Filters due to its excellent avalanche behavior, good performance and collision 
resistance. 
Hence the hash function chosen for our implementation is murmur hash which 
takes the n-grams extracted before as input and hashes them. These hash values are used 
to the set the bits and perform look ups during training and detection respectively. 
3.3.2.4 Comparing Hash Table and Bloom Filter   
Hash Table and Bloom Filter are compared based on the following criteria: 
1. Space and Time complexity : Look-ups in STL container classes used for 
implementing hash tables are of complexity O (log n) where as both lookups and 
insertion are of order O (1) in Bloom Filters. Hence time complexity of Bloom 
Filters is lesser than that of hash tables. Space complexity is also higher in STL 
containers as every entry contains a hash value and a pointer to a list of elements 
where as Bloom Filter contains a single array with zeros and ones. 
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2. Ability to dynamically update the data structure as more data becomes 
available:  Updating the data structure involves hashing and adding an element 
to the list in Hash table. It involves hashing and flipping a bit in an array in 
Bloom Filter. Hence insertions are slightly more involved in hash table though 
there are no considerable differences between the two. 
3. False positives and false negatives: Bloom Filter can determine if an element 
may exist in the set or not where as Hash table determines if an element does 
exist in the set or not. Also many inputs can set the same bit in Bloom Filter and 
there is no way to perform a reverse mapping. Hence false positives are 
theoretically more in Bloom Filter compared to hash table. But one of the 
advantages of Bloom Filters is that false positive rates can be adjusted by the 
choice of hash function used and other Bloom Filter parameters. Also there is no 
possibility of having false negatives (returning false for lookups when a value 
actually exists in the set) by the very nature of its construction. 
Considering the pros and cons of both approaches, Bloom filter is chosen to test 
the intrusion detection for MODBUS traffic due to the following reasons: 
 Extremely compact way to represent a set and hence can be suitable for 
representing the regular traffic patterns in SCADA communication. 
 Space-efficient compared to other data structures like arrays, linked lists and 
hash tables and used in many network applications [17]. Hence this can be 
suitable for light-weight implementation at resource constrained devices like 
PLCs, RTUs. 
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 False negatives do not occur and there is a trade-off between the false positive 
rate and memory requirements.  
3.4 Including Physical Information for Intrusion Detection 
The discussed intrusion detection approach takes into account only the 
communication patterns in the SCADA networks. However as these patterns are strongly 
correlated with the physical information in the power system, it is good to consider the 
possibility of including physical states in the intrusion detection. This can be explained 
with respect to the operating states of a power system as shown in Figure 10: 
 
Figure 10 State Diagram for Power System Operation 
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In the normal operating state, the total load power can be supplied by existing 
generators without violation of any operational constraints. Examples of some 
operational constraints are limits on transmission line flows, voltage magnitudes, etc. In 
the emergency operating state, though some operational constraints are violated, the 
power system still supplies power to all the loads. In this state, the system operator takes 
corrective measures to bring the system back to normal state. The corrective measures 
can include disconnecting few loads, lines, opening and closing of breakers etc.  If these 
measures fix the operating limit violations and makes the system stable with a 
reconfigured topology, some load versus generation balance has to be restored for the 
system to start supplying all loads again. This state is known as restorative state. 
Hence the set of actions performed by the system operator vary according to the 
operating states of a power system. This in turn affects the way in which normal and 
abnormal behavior can be defined for the MODBUS request/response functions. For 
example, the set of MODBUS commands which may be anomalous under normal 
operating state may be normal under emergency operating conditions, as the operator has 
to take certain corrective measures under emergency state.  
Hence the training data should be different for normal, emergency and restorative 
states and while the intrusion detection system is used on line, the detection should take 
into account the current state of the power system. If the physical state of the system is 
not considered, there are more possibilities for normal MODBUS traffic to be classified 
as abnormal and vice versa. For example, the function code 0x01 in MODBUS 
corresponds to “Read Coils” operation. This command also restarts the device and runs 
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some start-up tests. Seeing this function code frequently within a time window may be 
abnormal under normal system state. However, this can be a valid operation under 
emergency state. If the intrusion detection system does not take this physical state into 
account while assigning an anomaly score to the tested communication pattern, normal 
traffic would be assigned a higher anomaly score. This results in higher false positives. 
This shows the necessity to include physical state of the power system into consideration 
during intrusion detection and this requires a constant feedback from the power system 
to the field devices like RTUs, PLCs. 
The physical state of the power system is usually estimated using a process called 
state estimation. According to [19], if a power system has ‘l’ measurement devices and 
‘r’ state variables, an adversary needs to compromise at least l-r+1 measurements to 
ensure that he can falsify state estimation. However l-r+1 is usually large for a power 
system. Even an IEEE 300-bus test system has l-r+1 =824. This shows the difficulty 
level for the attacker to falsify the physical state of the power system and in turn the 
robustness of our intrusion detection approach by including the physical information. 
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4. SIMULATIONS 
The overall setup, tools and software and the data sets used in the 
implementation of the proposed Bloom Filter approach are discussed in Section 4.1. The 
results obtained are discussed in Section 4.2. 
4.1 Setup and Tools Used 
The overall setup used in the training and detection phases of the proposed 
Bloom Filter approach is explained as follows: The major tools used are Wireshark, a 
network protocol analyzer and C++. The data extraction, creation of Bloom Filter during 
training and anomaly detection are implemented in software using C++. The training 
phase is represented in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 Overall Setup for Training Using Bloom Filter 
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The training data is taken from the MODBUS manuals [16]. The PDUs from 
these have been analyzed using Wireshark. A sample Wireshark trace of a MODBUS 
PDU is shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12 MODBUS Packet in Wireshark 
The packet shown consists of the function code 16 (0x10) and data 0xf0f0. 
During training phase, such information is extracted from the MODBUS PDUs and few 
more similar patterns are generated using random number generators.  These training 
data are stored in a file and then function codes and data are extracted from this file 
using n-gram analysis. Then they are stored in two different files as shown in Figure 11. 
Each n-gram is then hashed and stored in a compressed form using Bloom Filter. Two 
different Bloom filters are created, one for function code and the other for the 
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corresponding data which will be used in the detection later. The setup used for the 
detection is shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13 Overall Setup for Anomaly Detection Using Bloom Filter 
During the detection phase, different MODBUS PDUs corresponding to normal 
data and cyber attacked data are taken from [16] and using n-gram analysis, function 
codes and data are extracted as in the training phase. After data extraction, look-ups are 
performed for each n-gram against the Bloom filters created during training. Each bloom 
filter’s result is used for assigning a score to the tested pattern. The weighted sum of the 
scores from the two filters is the final score signifying the confidence in the anomalous 
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behavior of the tested pattern. Using this training and detection procedure, several 
experiments have been performed to test the intrusion detection approach. 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
From a training input set consisting of 100 MODBUS PDUs, information such as 
function code and data was extracted using a sliding window of length ‘5’ during 
training.  The parameter of the Bloom filter ‘k’ (number of hash functions) was varied 
from 2 to 6 and the results of the intrusion detection system are tabulated in Table 4: 
 
Table 4 Performance of the Intrusion Detection Approach with Varying ‘k’ 
Value of k 2 4 6 
m(size of the Bloom 
filter) 
289 580 870 
No. of bits set in ‘v’ 
after training 
202 404 606 
Percentage of times 
normal pattern is 
classified as 
anomalous (false 
positive) 
0 0 0 
Percentage of times 
anomalous is 
classified as 
normal(false 
negative) 
6% 2% 2% 
 
In Table 4, the parameter ‘m’ was calculated using the formula                         
k= (ln 2) *(m/n). For example, when k=4, m= (n*k)/ (ln 2) = (100*2)/ (ln 2) = 580 which 
is the size of the bloom filter. As seen, the size of the bloom filter increases with the 
number of hash functions. Also, it can be seen that more than half of the bits are set in 
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the vector ‘v’ in all three cases. This is one of the criteria to reduce the false positive rate 
as per [16]. 
By the nature of construction of bloom filter, false negatives are not possible 
where as false positive rate can be adjusted by tuning its parameters. However, Table 4 
shows a constant false positive rate of 0 and a non-zero value for false negatives. This is 
because the false negative of the bloom filter corresponds to false positive of the overall 
system. This can be explained as follows: false negative in Bloom filter is equivalent to 
saying “a particular sequence is not valid when it is actually valid”. This is not possible 
because if the sequence is valid and is included in the training data set, it would be 
represented in a compressed form in the bloom filter. Hence any normal pattern 
represented by the filter during training will not be classified as anomalous during 
detection. In other words, the system cannot have false positives with proper training 
data set. The results are in accordance with this fact. 
In a similar manner, the false positive rate of the bloom filter corresponds to the 
false negative rate of the overall system. Hence we see a non zero false negative rate for 
the system. We can also infer that there is a decrease in the false negative rate when ‘k’ 
is increased from 2 to 4. But when it is increased beyond 4 there is not much 
improvement in false negative rate. Hence it is sufficient to have 4 independent hash 
functions to achieve nominal detection for the chosen data. It is possible to generate 
these 4 independent and uniformly distributed hash functions by just varying the seed 
parameter in murmur hash. 
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Another test case is performed by varying n from 100 to 500 for a constant k=4 
and the results of the intrusion detection system are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 Performance of the Intrusion Detection Approach with Varying ‘n’ 
Value of n 100 200 500 
m (size of the Bloom 
filter) 
580 1159 2899 
No. of bits set in ‘v’ 
after training 
402 799 2000 
Percentage of times 
normal pattern is 
classified as 
anomalous (false 
positive) 
0 0 0 
Percentage of times 
anomalous is 
classified as 
normal(false 
negative) 
2.4% 0% 0% 
 
From Table 5, we can infer that there is a decrease in the false negative rate when 
‘n’ is increased from 100 to 200. But when it is increased beyond 200 there is not much 
improvement in false negative rate. Hence a training data set of size 200 (n=200) and 4 
different hash functions (k=4) were chosen and the intrusion detection algorithm was 
tested. The sample output obtained from the detection algorithm is shown in Figure 14. 
Testing function sequence: 55555     Data sequence: 0000000000 
The tested function sequence does not exist in the training set 
cumulative Anomaly Score=0.5 
Testing function sequence: 55555     Data sequence: 00FF00FF00 
The tested function sequence does not exist in the training set 
cumulative Anomaly Score=1.0 
Testing function sequence: 15151 
The tested function sequence does not exist in the training set 
cumulative Anomaly Score=0.5 
 
Figure 14 Sample Output 1 
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We can see that the anomaly score for the same function sequence ‘55555’ varies 
between 0.5 and 1.0 for different payload data. This can be explained as follows: 
Function code ‘5’ corresponds to “Force Single Coil” (Appendix A).  This command 
forces a coil to be ON or OFF. This is determined using the data field. ‘FF’ in the data 
field corresponds to ON and ‘00’ corresponds to OFF.  The function code sequence 
15151 corresponds to “Read Coil- Write Coil- Read Coil-Write Coil-Read Coil”. As the 
command “read coil” restarts the device and runs some start-up tests, occurrence of this 
pattern quite frequently within a time window is classified as anomalous. The results of 
the intrusion detection algorithm are summarized in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6 Results for Training Using Data under “Normal” Conditions 
Size of the training data set (n) 200 
No. of hash functions used in Bloom Filter (k) 4 
No. of bits in the vector (v) in Bloom Filter (m) 1159 
No. of n-gram patterns used for testing 500 
Percentage of times normal pattern is classified as anomalous (false positive) 0 
Percentage of times anomalous is classified as normal(false negative) 2.4 
Anomaly score for testing the function code sequence 55555 and data 
00FF00FF00 (this alternates coil ON and coil OFF operations) –Data under a 
possible attack 
1.0 
Anomaly score for testing the function code sequence 55555 and data 
0000000000 - Anomalous data, may not signify an attack and hence reduced 
anomaly score 
0.5 
Anomaly score for testing the function code sequence 15151 (this is valid data 
under emergency conditions) 
0.5 
  
From Table 6, we see that false negative rate is 2.4 %, false positive rate is zero 
and more than half of the bits are set in the vector ‘v’. This is similar to the results 
obtained by varying the parameters ‘k’ and ‘n’. 
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Another thing to be noted is that the pattern 15151 which is given an anomaly 
score of 0.5 in the above case may be valid under some conditions. For example, this 
may be valid under emergency state of the power system as some restorative actions are 
taken during this state. Hence training is carried out using the data under emergency 
conditions and sample output obtained is shown in Figure 15. 
Testing function sequence: 53523 
The tested function sequence may exist in the training set 
cumulative Anomaly Score=0 
Testing function sequence: 55555     Data sequence: 0000000000 
The tested function sequence does not exist in the training set 
cumulative Anomaly Score=0.5 
Testing function sequence: 15151 
The tested function sequence may exist in the training set 
cumulative Anomaly Score=0 
 
Figure 15 Sample Output 2 
 In this case, the same pattern 15151 is assigned an anomaly score of 0. 
 
The results of the intrusion detection algorithm after training using emergency data are 
summarized in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 Results for Training Using Data under “Emergency” Conditions 
Size of the training data set (n) 200 
No. of hash functions used in Bloom Filter (k) 4 
No. of bits in the vector (v) in Bloom Filter (m) 1159 
No. of n-gram patterns used for testing 500 
Percentage of times normal pattern is classified as anomalous (false positive) 0 
Percentage of times anomalous is classified as normal(false negative) 2.4 
Anomaly score for testing the function code sequence  55555 and data 
0000FF000000FF000000 (this alternates coil ON and coil OFF operations) –
Data under a possible attack 
1.0 
Anomaly score for testing the function code sequence  55555 and data 
00000000000000000000 (this alternates coil ON and coil OFF operations) - 
Anomalous data, may not signify an attack and hence reduced anomaly score 
0.5 
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Size of the training data set (n) 200 
Anomaly score for testing the function code sequence  15151 (this is valid data 
under emergency conditions) 
0 
 
 
When training was done using normal data, the sequence 15151 was given an 
anomaly score of 0.5 and when trained using emergency data, the same sequence was 
given an anomaly score of 0. Hence without the knowledge of physical state of the 
system, it is not possible to ascertain the correct anomaly score. When information 
regarding the physical state of the power system is available, the anomaly scores are 
correlated with the physical information and the results are shown in Figure 16.   
If the current state of the power system is “normal”, then the results 
become 
Testing function sequence: 15151 
The tested function sequence does not exist in the training set 
State=normal 
cumulative Anomaly Score=1 
If the current state of the power system is “emergency”, then the results 
become 
Testing function sequence: 15151 
The tested function sequence does not exist in the training set 
state=emergency 
cumulative Anomaly Score=0 
 
Figure 16 Sample Output 3 
During the execution of this algorithm, input data sets of size 100, 1000 or greater 
than 1000 had an execution time of the order of few milliseconds. This shows that the 
time complexity of the algorithm is almost constant for various training input sizes. This 
is one of the advantages of Bloom Filter approach. 
Table 7 Continued 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
A Bloom Filter based intrusion detection approach for resource constrained 
SCADA field devices like PLCs, RTUs, etc. is proposed. This has been tested on 
SCADA traffic using MODBUS protocol. Bloom Filter has been compared with other 
data structures like hash tables, linked lists, etc and found to be more advantageous due 
to the following reasons: 
 Low memory requirements. 
 False positive rates for the overall intrusion detection system are zero for all the 
test cases performed. 
 Unlike other data structures, Bloom filter does not store the information directly 
and hence it provides data anonymity. 
 The proposed approach has been tested with and without the knowledge of the 
current state of the power system. It is inferred that knowledge of the current state of the 
power system helps to reduce false positives in the proposed approach. This shows the 
importance of correlation between the information from SCADA components and 
information from the physical system to have better intrusion detection.   
 In most cases, SCADA server is protected by using a Demilitarized zone (DMZ) 
which acts as a buffer between SCADA and corporate networks. However our proposed 
system adopts a distributed intrusion detection approach which is meant to reside at end 
field devices like PLCs, RTUs, etc.  The advantage is that the system can be partially 
operational even if few field devices are compromised.  
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5.1 Future Work 
Following are few of the considerations for future work. 
 As actual SCADA field data for power systems were not available, training and 
testing was mainly based on [16] and hence limited in nature. Testing the 
approach using actual field data should be considered for future work.  
 The parameters used in our approach are function code sequences and the data in 
the MODBUS PDUs. More parameters can be added to the intrusion detection 
algorithm to make it more robust.  
 While determining the overall anomaly score, the current algorithm assigns equal 
weight (=1) to all the parameters. This can be changed according to the 
importance of the parameters when more features are added to the intrusion 
detection system. 
 The proposed approach has mainly focused on Man-in-the-middle and HMI 
compromise attacks. It has to be tested for attack scenarios. 
 Alerts generated by the proposed intrusion detection system need to be correlated 
and aggregated for better reporting. 
 The anomaly score obtained from the proposed approach can be correlated in a 
better manner with the power system parameters. 
 The current algorithm has been implemented and tested in a standalone C++ 
environment. This can be integrated in a test bed containing SCADA server, 
HMI and power system components to study the interaction between the various 
systems.  
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APPENDIX A 
MODBUS function codes and descriptions 
 
01- Read Coils 
02- Read Discretes 
03- Read holding registers 
04-Read Input registers 
05- Write Coil 
06- Write Register 
07- Read Exception Status 
08- Diagnostics 
0B-Get Comm Event Counter 
0C-Get Comm Event Log 
0F-Write Multiple Coils 
10-Write Multiple Registers 
11-Report Slave ID 
14-Read File Record 
15-Write File record 
16-Mask Write Register 
17-Read/Write Multiple Registers 
18-Read FIFO Queue  
 
Hash functions 
[1] One-at-a-Time Hash: 
unsigned int oat( void *key, int len ) 
 { 
  unsigned char *s = key; 
  unsigned int hash = 0; 
  int i;  
  for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ )  
  { 
   hash += s[i]; 
   hash += ( hash << 10 ); 
   hash ^= ( hash >> 6 ); 
  } 
  
   hash += ( hash << 3 ); 
   hash ^= ( hash >> 11 ); 
   hash += ( hash << 15 );  
   return hash; 
 } 
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[2] Sax Hash: 
unsigned int sax_hash ( void *key, int len ) 
{ 
  unsigned char *s = key; 
  unsigned int hash = 0; 
  for ( int i = 0; i < len; i++ ) 
      hash ^= ( hash << 5 ) + ( hash >> 2 ) + s[i]; 
   
  return hash; 
} 
 
[3] FNV hash: 
Initalize hash to the value of offset_basis 
For each octet of data to be hashed 
 hash = hash * fnv_prime 
 hash = (hash) xor (octet of data) 
return hash 
where hash =‘n’ bit unsigned integer 
                n =bit length of the hash and  
FNV_prime is dependent on ‘n’ 
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